

Theorizing the Inability of Organizational Leaders and Manager to See and Act

Michel Mestre
School of Business
Biola University
La Mirada, CA
michel.mestre@biola.edu

and

Senyo Adjibolosoo
Fermanian School of Business
Point Loma Nazarene University
San Diego, CA
sadjibol@ptloma.edu

**A Paper prepared for presentation at the October 13th – 15th 2005 CBFA
Conference—School of Business, Point Loma Nazarene University, San Diego, CA**

Theorizing the Inability of Organizational Leaders and Manager to See and Act

ABSTRACT

Business organizations encounter complex issues and challenges in the course of their daily operations. When hindrances are left unattended, they create impediments which limit organizational effectiveness. Furthermore, a compounding effect of such loose ends contributes to a downward spiral in performance. Therefore, key to the organization's success is the willingness to tackle such issues. However, many consultants and researchers will attest to the reluctance of the members of the organization to confront reality. The sad reality is that most companies don't face reality very well (Bossidy *et al*, 2002). Most frequently, leaders and managers either fail to perceive prevailing difficulties or leave them unattended until some form of a crisis develops. This paper reviews generally agreed causes for such behavior. It is argued that until the leadership employs a different management process which takes into account such practices, most results will prove disappointing. The process needs to start with a leadership prepared and willing to see, and deal with the problematic issues.

1. INTRODUCTION

Every organization faces numerous challenges that have to be dealt with in order to enhance operational effectiveness. Empirical evidence reveals that, usually, it is not easy for organizational leaders and managers to address these problems clearly and effectively. Even in cases where the problem is obvious to others, many leaders refuse to engage the issues. The concern is not a new one. Adam's interaction with God (*Genesis* 3: 8-12), Aaron's fear of the people by acquiescing in fashioning the golden calf (*Exodus* 32), Saul's initial refusal to admit his disobedience (*1Samuel* 15: 10-23), Eli's reluctance to confront the behavior of his sons (*1Samuel* 2: 12 -3:13), and many more illustrate the

human propensity to accommodate situations. The synopsis of three illustrative cases representing the inability of certain leaders' and managers' failure to see and act appropriately is presented below.

1.1. The Abilene Syndrome

It is 104 degrees in Coleman, Texas. A father-in-law suggests that his son-in-law, his daughter, and his wife go to Abilene, 53 miles away, for lunch. They travel in a car without air-conditioning, over a dirt road. The lunch turns out to be terrible. Upon return to the house, four hours later, the son-in-law (Harvey, 1988) comments: "it was a great trip, wasn't it?" He was then pelted by all three individuals indicating that it had been a lousy idea, each blaming the other for this disastrous experience. Harvey concludes that "organizations frequently take action in contradiction to what they really want to do. Organization members fail to accurately communicate their desires and/or beliefs to one another. In fact, they do just the opposite and thereby lead one another into misperceiving the collective reality."

1.2. A Pastor Ghettoizes Himself in the Fortress of Denial

A senior pastor retired from a church of about six hundred people. When he left, a group of leaders led the congregation. These people worked together as a cohesive team under the leadership of one man who had just finished his Masters Degree program in Theological Studies and enrolled in a pastoral training program to become ordained. A few years later, the congregation was flourishing and doing well in every regard. They had many programs, the people were happy and the finances were good. In the midst of this progress, some members of the congregation wanted a senior pastor. To honor their requests, a search committee was created and assigned the task of locating and hiring the best candidate. This search led to the hiring of a senior pastor and the existing leader became his associate.

Unfortunately, the new pastor's authoritarian style of leadership began to get to the congregants. Since their complaints were not being listened to, people began to leave

the church. The finances began to dwindle. Every suggestion the Associate Pastor made to the Senior Pastor fell on deaf ears. Over time, things grew from bad to worse. Sadly, the Senior Pastor could not put his finger on the primary source of the problem, namely, himself. Any attempt by the lay leadership to help was rebuffed. His relationship with the associate pastor deteriorated. Finally, the Associate Pastor resigned his position and left the church. It was not long after this departure that the problems of leadership weaknesses and inefficiencies boiled over! The Senior Pastor lost favor even in the face of his own supporters and finally resigned from the position and left. By this time, the total number of congregants was down, finances and church programs suffered. To the end, the individual was unwilling or unable to confront the root causes of the situation.

1.3. Grade Inflation

For many years, grade inflation has been a significant problem in many high schools, universities, colleges, and community schools. Though this problem is well-known to faculty members and administrators, hardly does anyone do anything to deal with the problem. Reasons for inflating student grades may be to win students' favor and applause. In many cases, grade inflation is a practice that bodes very well with the concept of *quid pro quo*. That is, as long as these faculty members and administrators deliver the desired grades to the students, the students in turn deliver great course, teacher, and administrator evaluations. In certain high schools, colleges, and universities, grade inflation is intentionally practiced as a means of helping the graduates from these institutions gain admission to Ivy League institutions of learning. To them, this is an excellent way to assist their graduates to move on to prestigious careers in life. Little do they know that their behavior and actions lead to the production of stunted future managers and leaders. Even administrators and faculty members who are aware that they too contribute to the problem do not easily acknowledge their role in creating and perpetuating the situation. When confronted with the reality of the statistics, a senior vice-president rationalized the problem and lack of resolve as "academic freedom."

1.4 The General Challenge

In today's business environment, the image of Enron comes to mind. Recent convictions in the business world have shown the elaborate effort to disguise the facts with the use of new labels such as aggressive accounting. The disrespect of existing accounting standards by new renditions which are meant to deceive and misrepresent are then given some semblance of respectability. We all have a propensity to give a blind eye to situations as exemplified by the depiction of the ostrich putting its head in the sand. As a result, the leaders are unable to successfully design and implement appropriate solutions. This lack of willingness to deal with or see these obstacles leads to painful experiences for all the people involved. If there is a way to assist leaders to be more open, willing and ready to see and act, they will be better positioned to lead and manage their organizations through periods of difficult crises.

In light of these observations, the primary objective of this paper is to thoroughly investigate these phenomena and provide empirically based and theoretically sound explanations as to why leaders and managers most frequently fail to see and act appropriately, in a timely manner. We argue that until leaders and managers are willing to act, the problem of organizational ineffectiveness, and the risk of long-term failure or hardship will not go away. It is concluded that the problems facing organizations can be minimized when their leaders, managers, and employees are trained to acquire the knowledge and abilities they need for the organization to perform at its best.

To see, discern, observe, watch, look, and search are all terms with which the sense of sight is directly involved. Yet regardless of these numerous terms, it is surprising that people who lead and work in organizations are continually blindsided. They are most frequently unable to identify and decipher issues and situations that most keen observers would have no difficulty in identifying. As a result, people are unable to perceive, and thus, deal with issues that have the potential to pose tremendous setbacks to the business unit. Even when people see the "handwriting on the wall" and the potential for imminent failure, it is not all that easy for most of them to gain deeper insights into the issues and confront the situation. It is in this sense that seeing is being applied. It is viewed as the assessment of situations, followed by acknowledgement and actions which are indicative

of commitment. As such, acknowledgement, confrontation, action plans supported by accountability are key ingredients to change. Otherwise, the failure to see and act in a proactive way moves the problem to the zone of hopelessness. In this case, the applications of reactive solutions hardly ever lead to the constructive and successful resolution of the issues.

It is these realities that bring into the limelight certain questions which deal with the challenge of addressing issues. Top among these questions are:

1. What are the factors that stop us from seeing?
2. How can the individual's ability or power of observation be enhanced and used to the best advantage of the business organization?
3. Can appropriate conditions and situations be created for people to see well and also be ready and willing to act with moral conscience based on ethical principle?
4. Can people be taught to see?
5. If it is possible to teach people to see, what educational techniques and methodologies can be used to achieve optimal results in carrying out this function?
6. If people see, how do we get people to act?
7. Are there management processes/practices which will foster a proactive work environment?

The desire is to provide research-based answers to each of these questions and provide useful information that can be used to inform leaders and managers to activate their organizations. There are three major components of this paper: root causes for corporate blindness, avoidance strategies, and tactics to a proactive environment. The last section of this paper contains some recommendations for policy and conclusions.

2. THE ROOT CAUSES TO INDIVIDUAL BLINDNESS

Potentially, there are two broad causes for "not seeing." One is a question of being ill-equipped in terms of skills or criteria to make a proper evaluation. The second cause, more insidious, is the fear to confront reality.

2.1. Being ill-equipped

The concern for seeing is not a new one. In a conversation between God and Isaiah 2500 years ago, Isaiah is told: “Go, and tell this people: ‘Keep on listening, but do not perceive; keep on looking, but do not understand’” (*Isaiah* 6: 9). Similarly in Acts 28:26, the verse is repeated and followed by an explanation in verse 27, for the heart of this people has become dull, and with their ears they can scarcely hear, and they closed their eyes; least they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and understand with their heart ... Similarly, *Mark* 8: 17 states, “Do you not see and understand? Do you have a hardened heart?” While these verses are in a specific religious context, the basic principles have broader ramifications. The parallel can be drawn to the recent SARS epidemics in China. While the facts were there for a period of time, the authorities did not acknowledge the situation for what it was.

Furthermore, the Bible refers to blindness, walking in the dark, as a sign of lack of wisdom. ‘The wise man’s eyes are in his head, but the fool walks in darkness’ (*Ecclesiastes*. 2:14). Several key reasons are listed for not being able to see or hear in order to be able to understand. “For the heart of this people has become dull, they have closed their eyes (Mat.13:15; Acts 28:27). Do you have a hardened heart? (Mark 8:17) The facts are there for all to see but somehow, depending on the person, some perceive and others do not. The issue is not physical but one of having the wrong perspective. The word, *noeo*, which implies seeing, is used in the Greek New Testament to indicate the active scrutiny and observation with the mind. The attitudes, perspectives, and the benchmarks we use are keys for making accurate assessments of situations. Obvious from these biblical passages is the truth that seeing is a matter of choice. A second implicit element is the plumb line used in assessing situations and the comparison with the ideal, the truth.

When in high school, during the summer, the organization to which I belonged did wildlife surveys for a local university. One particular experience directly relates to the topic of seeing and observing. For two weeks, we were collecting insects. My teammate, Wolfgang Demish, and I were walking side by side on a dirt road. His net was swinging furiously in the air. Five feet away from him my net was still, no bugs on my side! Or

were there any? Was it that I could not see them? My eyesight was perfect. In retrospect, there were probably just as many bugs on my side as there were on his. We even switched sides. I had yet to learn how to look. I saw but I did not see. Sometimes in traffic we say ‘where did this one come from?’ as the other automobilist indicates his displeasure. Maybe we did not look properly or what we saw was not reality. The importance of seeing is closely related to the interpretive process and the actions which ensue.

The lack of ability in reading situations is not limited to novices. Bardes *et al* (2001) describe how the study of paintings is used to develop the observational skills of doctors. This would indicate that head knowledge is not sufficient in order to be a good observer. Similarly, Goodson (2002) explains how Japanese managers were able to assess the performance at an American plant in a short period of time. Following the Japanese visit, experienced American managers went to Japan and returned without any comparable insights, ineffective in assessing this foreign environment. One major difference between the two groups was the intentionality of the Japanese and the lack of focus or indifference of the Americans. As a consultant, taking experienced business executives to visit plants in the area yielded similar results. In this case, while the whole purpose was to see how others managed their operations, they saw instead how other products were made. Experience is not necessarily sufficient. One could conclude that the process is not limited to the religious, medical, or business realm, but that the need for improved ability of observation is universal. Each of these situations shares seven basic features.

1. The starting point seems to be to have an attitude or willingness or even stronger, the discipline required to be able to observe, perceive, and scrutinize.
2. The facts are there for all to see.
3. It is not until the activities are scrutinized that the meaning of the behavior and processes can be truly assessed.
4. There are absolutes, laws, and principles at the core of observation. To be able to see, one must be cognizant of the basic laws which become the

plumb line to assess situations. Implicitly, it is not until a set of rules, schema, and filter or values are used in assessing the situation that, like Pandora's box, new vistas are opened on the nature of the activities.

5. The learning of these principles and their application is possible for anyone willing.
6. Training does not necessarily require a long period of time.
7. To maintain the integrity in using these principles is important. It seems that one might be prone to rationalize situations. Once in the compromising mode, it is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an accurate view of situations as one is actively involved in deceit.
8. Being in a Mode of Continuing Improvement: Ongoing Transformation

Therefore, to read or assess a situation is a skill that can be learned and therefore taught. While there are varying skills levels, if the diagnostic tools or forensic approaches are valid and predictive, any individual, with a certain amount of training, should be able to read situations.

2.2. Fear of Addressing the Issues

Various authors have addressed resistance to change in a number of ways. In what follows in the remainder of this section we present a synopsis of each of these groupings of the fear to address the issues. Examples of these groupings include on the basis of content of the issue, the thinking process of the individual, group behavior, the existing organizational culture, and being wedded to status quo. Let us now take a look at each reason briefly.

2.2.1. On the Basis of the Content of the Issue

Some like Tichy (1990) describe the reasons on the basis of content of the issue. For example, members of this group are intimidated to address the problems or issues

because they are afraid of what the perceived political and technical implications are. When any leader who falls into this category has any reason to believe that any actions taken to address the problem will lead to the commission of political suicide, he or she will prefer to ignore the issue hoping that it will go away. The general belief of people who constitute this group is that once they do not tackle the problem they cannot be accused of having created any additional difficulties their political decisions may have created for either the whole nation or a segment of the community. Similarly, the inability to comprehend the underlying technical issues may be so frightening that leaders and managers will decide to not get involved with any proposals to deal with prevailing problems. Viewed in their light, their fear of either exposing their ignorance about the primary technical issues or even failing denies them the ability and willingness to want to tackle the problem head-on.

2.2.2. The Thinking Process of the Individual

Others attempt to analyze the thinking process of individuals such as denial (Manouros & Williams, 1998), subjective utility (Miller & Nelson, 2002), self-indictment (Senge, 2003), fear of repercussion (Schaffer, 1991; Patterson *et al*, 2004). Leaders who fall into this category are paralyzed by their thinking processes and the fear of what the implications of their decisions may be. Since these leaders may not want to *rock the boat*, they prefer to let sleeping dogs lie. In addition, the direct implications of the results of the decision for their subjective utility become crucial. That is, when they have any reasons to believe that the decision to be made will minimize their own lifetime subjective utility and those of their closest subordinates, they prefer not to make any decisions and take actions.

2.2.3. Group Behavior or Herd Mentality

Some will view resistance to change as group behavior such as pluralistic ignorance (Halbesleben, 2002; Peterson, 1994), Abilene Paradox (Harvey, 1988; deoxy.org, 2004). Viewed in this light, the individual manager or leader's disposition

regarding whether or not to take any concrete action is determined by the degree to which he or she subscribes to the herd mentality or group behavior. For example, though the manager or leader may be keenly aware of the problem issues, he or she will not be highly motivated enough to take actions because the effort may be misinterpreted by others as going against the grain. More so, in societies such as Japan where conformity is expected, the individual will not want to jeopardize group cohesiveness by taking action that is contrary to that of the group. Thus, though one may be aware of problem issues in the organization, one will be unwilling to act independently to deal with the situation, especially in cases where everyone else prefers to cruise on pluralistic ignorance.

2.2.4. The Existing Organizational Culture

Others see patterns of behavior conditioned by the existing organizational culture such as learned helplessness (Seligman & Maier, 1967; Peterson, 1994), covenantal relationship (Barnett & Schubert, 2002), and sense of fairness, procedural and interactional justice (Brashear *et al*, 1995; Masterson *et al*, 2000; Roberson *et al*, 1999) as one of the key factors. For example, the existing cultural practice can also act either as a trap or hindrance that prevents the individual leader or manager to act to solve the problem. An excellent case of this reality is when someone observes the problem but has the view that “this is the way we have always done it in the past. As a result, don’t let anyone else do it different.” In this case, conventions become the stumbling block to a manager or leader who is not prepared to see and act appropriately in the first place. Leaders and managers who think and behave in this manner cruise on learned helplessness. These people say to themselves and argue in the presence of others: “Though I am prepared to act, others are not. As a result, I will just let life go on as it has always been in the organization.”

2.2.5. Being Wedded to Status Quo

Kim and Mauborgne (2003) see organizations as being wedded to status quo, limited resources, de-motivated staff, and opposition from powerful vested interests.

Others look at the management process. Harvey (1974) is concerned with the inability to manage agreement or potential disagreement while Argyris (1983) points to the lack of awareness between what they espouse and what they actually do in practice.

Fear is a common element in many of these concerns. Schaffer (1991) identifies the risk involved at an interpersonal level: the current boss may be the predecessor in the position, and might look bad; increased resistance of subordinates; embarrassment of failing to reach goals; failure of subordinates may require drastic action; and fear of rejection. Arguably, it is evident that the fears of certain managers and leaders to perceive and deal appropriately with observed problems stem from their unwillingness to lose face, position, power, authority, and control. Other cases, one of the most primary reasons is to not place oneself in any position of discomfort.

3. AVOIDANCE STRATEGIES: FAILING AND REFUSING TO SEE

Seeing also implies the willingness to change. Over the ages a number of strategies have been developed by members of the organization to avoid seeing. Part of the change process is to recognize that there will be resistance to change. One technique is the ostrich solution. If you put your head in the sand, what you do not see does not exist. Another is that to conform is better than to transform, or to avoid any form of stake in the existing situation: "I only work here." This sort of apathy is a deadly disease when operating in a global environment which changes rapidly and requires the best of an organization. With less than full commitment from all members, how can an organization survive?

Seeing the truth and saying the truth are two different things. The problem in organizations is that it is difficult for people involved to tell the difference. The palatability of the truth will color the way the reality is expressed. A number of euphemisms are usually used to lend a semblance of respectability to the practices such as political correctness, and spin or filtering process. The example that comes to mind is the story of the king who wore a suit of such a fine fiber that no one could see the cloth. It was not until a little kid, who did not know any better, blurted out "the king is naked!" that the reality of the situation was finally accepted. The Japanese have three words:

- *Honne*: Which is saying what you really mean;
- *Tatemae*: Which is what you say, but not necessarily mean; and
- *Shinri*: Which relates to what is difficult to confront.

From these definitions (Mestre *et al*, 2005), seeing and saying can be dangerous practices to engage in!

The other strategy to avoid seeing the issues is to place in question the competency or discredit the other individual. Many times, as a consultant, the response heard from individuals is: “You don’t understand our business,” “we tried it before and it does not work.” Such responses are calls to accommodate the situation, to which there can be only one reply: “Are these the facts,” “Is **this the** situation?” Action and commitment are two ingredients missing from the procrastinator’s vocabulary.

In order to avoid such embarrassment subterfuge strategies may be employed:

- Rationalize that all has been done to establish high expectations;
- Call expansion of resources or additional authority;
- Manager may decide to take on more personally;
- Reliance on procedure;
- Fail to establish accountability;
- Convey a lack of commitment to the goals or instructions (Schaffer, 1991).
- Tradition and Protocol

Each of these various strategies is used effectively. Peer pressure, political savvy, and other such labels are used to legitimize such practices of avoiding facing the situation. Each of us constructs reality and develop solutions based upon our individual worldview. Differences in belief about reality produce (or accompany) differences in our sources of meaning and knowledge, value processes (morality and ethics), and attitudes toward authority and freedom. We ask questions of “why” and “what for” out of our own values and to determine those of others, to see the intentions and criteria behind their choices. Conflicts arise from constructions in our minds, from the beliefs and styles by which an individual or group makes choices; only incidentally are they in the content of the issue. Any social change, even a threat of a plan for change, becomes the occasion for

the separation of a community into subgroups of common sensibilities. Any attempt to systematically resolve conflict therefore needs to recognize the dynamics of interaction among different views of reality, that is, different worldviews (McWhinney, 1992).

It is becoming apparent that we create an arguably large part of our problems and issues in the very act of trying to resolve them. We create the messes we are in, sometimes by blatantly destructive acts but often unwittingly in the course of dealing with other problems. Society becomes a self-generator of problems. The result is that each effort to solve a problem creates new problems. We must treat each such complex as an issue, or outflow, resulting from fundamental inconsistencies in the social fabric (McWhinney, 1992).

4. KEY STEPS TO ENDING ORGANIZATIONAL BLINDNESS

A number of authors point out the importance of details. Gladwell (2000) shows that little things, when taken on their own, cannot trigger a crisis. When the effect from other conditions is cumulative, a crisis can ensue, such as with an epidemic. Spear (2002) relates how studies conducted by Heindrich (1931) and others (Bird & Germain, 1966; Fletcher, 1972; Goldberg, 1996) showed that crises only occur a fraction of the time, when the cumulative effect of a number of factors occur at the same time. The implication of such findings point to the need to address such occurrences, even when an impending disaster is not anticipated. Gladwell (2000) underscores this principle in his analysis of the changes in the New York City crime prevention program.

The context, or environmental cues which indicated indifference, while not significant in direct causation of crime, were instrumental in allowing the crime culture to fester. In addressing these environmental factors, the removal of cultural benchmarks enabled the city to change attitudes, and thus reduce crime. The same principles are involved in assessing situations in a corporate context. The sensitivity to details allows for reading of values and culture by the interpretation of actions and artifacts.

How can we make people to see? Or, as the old saying goes—you can take a horse to the water but you can not force it to drink. People need to take an active

response in looking. In visiting a Canadian company in China, students had the opportunity to observe workers, in their neat blue uniforms, gathered around a conveyor belt where large containers were being filled with pressurized gas. As the containers flowed down the conveyor belt, one worker would remove the cover, the next would open the valve, the next would connect the hoses to fill the tank. Then the process would be repeated, this time in reverse: close the valves, remove the hoses, replace the cover. The students were impressed by the beehive of activity until the process was more closely scrutinized.

One adjustable wrench was shared by workers at different stations along the line. Two different sizes of nuts had to be either tightened or opened. Each time the tool had to be adjusted. As the process was being described to the students, they started to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the operation in a different light. Everything described, they had been privy to, yet failed to make an accurate assessment. However, after describing the various operations in terms of patterns of behavior and artifacts employed, the students were able to truly assess the level of efficiency. The challenge remained to deduce the values and beliefs, the taxonomy which was used by the plant's workers and management to rationalize their activities. "We perceive the world not exactly as it is, but as it is useful for us to perceive it" (Myers, 2002). The task is to change the threshold of sensitivity so as to detect particular stimuli which would be indicative of existing conditions.

One simple test to apply to any situation is what the customer buys. He/she does not really want to pay for our inefficiency, our delays or poor quality. The way to test the time dimension is to assess the type of activity individuals are performing. Notice that nothing is being said about working harder. The whole philosophy is based on working smarter, not harder. This means that time is used by two basic kinds of activities, those which create a value added and those which do not. Activities such as watching the equipment running, walking to get tools, moving parts around may be considered by some as being productive, in reality these activities do not add any value-added to the product. When the work area is assessed in this context, a totally different picture evolves. A surprisingly small portion of our time is really value-added time.

Pictures can evoke different responses. A bulldozer leveling a lot is a good example. To the passer-by, it means that a new building is coming next, maybe a new store; to the neighbors, dust and noise; to the kids in the neighborhood, it is the loss of a playground; to the municipality it means a greater tax base. The person's frame of reference leads the observer to different conclusion while observing the same scene. The difference is the different value system employed by each of the beholders. The same diversity in conclusions would be present was at the mall, the beach, or in a work area. The willingness to accept someone else's assessment is, in a major portion, due to sharing the same values, which, in turn affect the choice of criteria. It is through this process of observing a number of situations that the students come to realize that there are, in fact, different premises, different value systems, and therefore different decisions or approaches.

One of the key elements is observation on the floor as compared to an office, conference room or video. The choice of media is important. The first distinction is that unless observations are first-hand, where it happens, the content is already processed, filtered, adulterated and, by definition, biased. The second reason for such an approach is for individuals to draw their own conclusions and findings. It is only by trial and error, and experience that the individual's sense of observation gets developed.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

How long does it take to gain insights about an organization, or even a culture? Some argue that to learn about an organization takes a long time. "Don't expect to be able to have an impact for a couple of years!" goes the typical adage. Time is the greatest friend of procrastinators. "Can't rush things," "Rome was not built in a day," "the honeymoon period" as an indication that much real work cannot be expected in a short period of time, and many more such phrases have gained respectability in our daily lives. The implication is that individuals need to learn to conform to the existing situation before they can be effective. The opposite is just what organizations need. But change is threatening. The issue is not about reading a situation. The first impression is probably the most accurate one. The issue of time is a political one. Don't rock the boat, conform

and everybody will love you. The crowning glory is when you are called a team player. Again, in the biblical context, this would have been the worst insult given to a prophet.

REFERENCES

- Argyris, C. (1993). "Knowledge for Action:," Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco.
- AQP editorial. (2000). From GE to Trilogy: How to Hand on a Legacy of Leadership (An Interview with Tichy. *Journal for Quality and Participation*, May/June, Vol. 23, #3: 6-12.
- Barnett, T., Schubert, E. (2002). Perceptions of Ethical Work Climate and covenantal Relationships. *Journal Of Business Ethics* Vol.36 279-290.
- Bardes, C.L., Gillers, D., Herman, A.E. (2001). Learning to look: Developing Clinical Observational Skills at an Art Museum. *Medical Education* 55 1157-1161.
- Bird, F. Jr., Germain, G. (1966). *Damage Control*. N.Y. American Management Assn.
- Bossidy, L., Charan, R., Burck, C. (2002) *Execution, The discipline of getting things done*. NY, Crown Business.
- Brashear, T.G., Manolis, C., Brooks, C.M. (2005). The Effects of Control, Trust, and Justice on Salesperson Turnover. *Journal of Business Research*. March, Vol.58, #3, 241-250.
- Fletcher, J. (1972). *The Industrial Environment: Total Loss Control*. Willowdale, Ontario: National Profile Ltd.
- Gladwell, M. (2002) *The Tipping Point*. Back Bay Books, NY.
- Goldberg, A. (1996). Finding Root Causes of Accidents. *Occupational Hazards*. Nov., Vol.58 #11, 33-39.
- Goodson, R. E.. (2002). Read a Plant-Fast *Harvard Business Review*, May, Vol. 80 #5, 105-114.
- Halbesleben, J.R.B. (2002) Pluralistic Ignorance: Development and Organizational Applications. *Academy of Management Proceedings*.
- Harvey, J.B. (1988). The Abilene Paradox: The Management of Agreement. *Organizational Dynamics*. Summer, Vol.17, #1, pp.17-44.
- Harvey, S. (2005) Employer Treatment of employees During a Community Crisis: The Role of Procedural and Distributive Justice. *Journal of Business & Psychology*. Vol. 20 #1, Fall, 53-68.
- Kim, W. C., Mauborgne, R. (2003). Tipping Point Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 81, #4, April, 60-67.
- Masterson, S., Lewis, K. Goldman, B., Taylor, M.S. (2000) Integrating Justice and Social Exchange: The Differing Effects of Fair Procedures and treatment on Work Relationships. *Academy of Management Journal* Vol. 43, #4 Aug., 738-749.
- McWhinney, W. (1992). *Paths of Change*. Sage Publications.
- Mestre, M., Stainer, A., Stainer, L. (2005). Making Situations Visible : Ethics, Truth, and Decisions. *Int'l J. Management and Decision Making*. Vol.6, #3/4, 315-325.
- Miller, D.T., Nelson, L.D. (2002) Seeing Approach Motivation in the Avoidance Behavior of Others of Others: Implications for an Understanding of Pluralistic

- Ignorance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*. Vol. 83, #5: 1066-1075.
- Paterson, C. (1994). Learned Helplessness, in V.S. Ramachandran (ed) *Encyclopedia of Human Behavior*, San Diego, CA. Academy Press.
- Patterson, K., Grenny, J., Mc Millan, R. (2004). *Crucial Confrontations*. NY. McGraw-Hill.
- Perlow, L.; Williams, S.. (2003) Is Silence Killing Your Company? *Harvard Business Review*, May, Vol. 81# 5, 52-58.
- Rooke, D. & Torbert, W.R. (2005). 7 Transformations of Leadership. *Harvard Business Review*, April, Vol. # , 67-76.
- Roberson, Q.M., Moye, N.A., Locke, E.A. (1999). Identifying a Missing Link Between Participation and Satisfaction: The Mediating Role of Procedural Justice Perceptions. *Journal of applied Psychology*, Vol. 84, #4: 585-593.
- Schaffer, R.H. (1991) Demand Better Results—and Get Them. *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 69 #2 Mar/Apr. , 142-150.
- Schaffer, R.H., Thomson, H.A. (1992) Successful Change Programs Begin with Results. *Harvard Business Review*, Vol.70, #1 Jan/Feb., 80-90.
- Senge, P.M. (2003). Taking Personal Change Seriously: The Impact of Organizational Learning on Management Practice. *Academy of Management Executive*. Vol. 17 #2, 47-50.
- Spear, J.E. (2002). Incident Investigation A Problem-Solving Process. *Professional Safety*. Vol.47, #2, 25-30.
- Spear, S., Bowen, H.K. (2002) Decoding the DNA of the Toyota Production System. *Harvard Business Review* Vol.77, #5, 96-107.
- Tichy/AQP editorial. (2000). From GE to Trilogy: How to Hand on a Legacy of Leadership (An Interview with Tichy. *Journal for Quality and Participation*, May/June, Vol. 23, #3: 6-12.